In July 1975, the American 'Apollo' spacecraft
docked with the Soviet 'Soyuz' in orbit, heralding the symbolic end of the Cold War's Space Race and initiating two harmonious decades of sustained international cooperation in outer space.
On January 11 2007, the People's Republic of China (PRC) conducted its first successful anti-satellite weapons test, destroying an inactive Chinese weather satellite along with twenty-two years of relative diplomatic tranquility. The target's altitude (535 miles above the Earth's surface) happened to align with the standard operational altitudes of American and Japanese imagery intelligence satellites. This was the first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test to take place since 1985, when the US used a military aircraft-launched missile to shoot down a malfunctioning observation satellite.
The impact of China's carefully-engineered collision generated immediate shockwaves throughout the developed world. In addition to scattering hazardous debris in orbit, the PRC's proven ASAT capabilities raised latent concerns about the international consequences of space weaponization. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao claimed that the PRC had announced the test to the international community beforehand, and that the country “will not participate in any kind of arms race in outer space”. Meanwhile East Asia experts within the US called the incident “China’s most provocative military action since it test-fired missiles off the coast of Taiwan more than a decade ago” [NY Times, Jan 2007]. The action demonstrated a growing tension between China’s diplomatic rhetoric of an intended ‘peaceful rise’, and the simultaneous ‘hard power’ development of lethal, high-tech capabilities to rival those of the US.
On December 6, 2010 I discussed this issue with a visiting Chinese scholar named Xuegang Zhang who delivered a presentation on ‘Space Power’ in the context of US-China relations. Asked to explain China's motivation in conducting the controversial ASAT test, he told me that it was "simply an experiment, a test of Chinese technological capabilities", and had “nothing to do with the moral or political reasons” that the US and others ascribed to it. Pausing briefly to think, he added that “it is necessary in international relations to have an advanced and powerful military in every arena in order to carry strength at the negotiating table”. Does the current international system give China just cause to view military strength as a diplomatic necessity? Evaluating the American model of hegemonic power since World War I and its staggering military expenditures on campaigns abroad in recent history, it would be a bit hypocritical to argue that China is acting 'immorally' by using force (threatened or realized) as a tool for promoting national interests.
Mr. Zhang’s statement about the moral irrelevance of its ASAT test resonates with a prominent strand of rhetoric espoused by the PRC, one which challenges America's right to infuse questions of subjective morality and justice into international relations issues. Moral authority is ultimately the luxury of the strong, often used to justify their own interests and provide long-term social support for idiosyncratic agendas. As the PRC’s strength increases and relative power dynamics shift, its leaders will naturally seek to alter the international system in ways that favor their own interests. China is openly challenging dominant American norms concerning the universality of American and Western principles, proposing instead that every nation is entitled to a large degree of sovereign discretion in conducting their activities- whether that involves destroying their own property in orbit or setting internal standards for human rights issues on the ground. While the tacit acceptance of human rights violations abroad indicates a deeply flawed foreign policy, I do believe that the PRC is entitled to expand and test its military capabilities. As long as such tests remain benign, the international community doesn't really have any other option than to let them continue. The US had its turn to develop ASAT weaponry in the mid-1980s, and China had the right to do so when it became technologically possible in the late 2000s.
So why is the US concerned about China’s ability to target and destroy a single satellite? Because we live in a world of relative anarchy, plagued with uncertainty about the future actions of other states. We are also increasingly dependent on satellite systems for normal military and economic operations. Today the average consumer in the developed world enjoys the myriad services of satellites on a daily basis: near-instantaneous global telecommunication, GPS navigation, high-resolution mapping, weather forecasting, satellite TV, and a variety of other amenities directly and indirectly supported by the global satellite network. Similar services also provide the technological backbone for modern military operations. Despite this high degree of dependence on satellites, international legislation coordinating and protecting the system in a military sense is surprisingly sparse.
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, which serves as the veritable magna carta of space law, contains one central rule: “space shall be preserved for peaceful purposes for all countries". However, existing arms control treaties do not explicitly ban weaponry from space. Instead, they prohibit the deployment or use of nuclear weapons in outer space, forbid the colonization of heavenly bodies for military purposes, and protect the rights of nations in using space-based resources to verify arms control accords and conduct peaceful activities. In 2001, former Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld sounded an alarmist warning that due to the “commercial and military importance of space to U.S. interests ... unless the U.S. develops full-scale space control capabilities, it will face the risk of a ‘Space Pearl Harbor,’" meaning an attack on its entire range of peaceful space assets. This attitude provoked an aggressive US stance on space militarization which gained inertia under the Bush Administration and led to an unprecedented development of space-related weapons and defense systems, reminiscent of the aggressive 'Star Wars' programs of the Reagan era. While not technically violating an enforceable arms agreement, these actions contradicted the ideological assumptions of peaceful conduct established in the 1967 OST, and likely induced China to develop its own ASAT capabilities in response.
In 2001 China presented an incomplete draft treaty to the UN banning the weaponization of space, and the following year China and Russia jointly proposed another treaty banning the use of Earth-based weapons against objects in space. The US declined to sign either document. America also has repeatedly refused to ratify the treaty to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), first called for by the UN General Assembly at the 2001 Geneva Conference. The 2001 PAROS vote passed 156 to 0, with the US, Micronesia, Israel, and Georgia abstaining, and the PRC among those voting in favor. Something obviously affected China’s stance in the handful of intervening years to bring them to conduct a successful ASAT 'experiment' by 2007. America's aggressive military policies and ongoing refusal to enter a binding non-weaponization agreement are certainly part of the equation.
Whether or not the PRC and the US will ultimately drag each other into war depends on a myriad of factors to be played out on the ground, and remains an unlikely prospect for the immediate future. If armed conflict does prove to be in the cards, however, it is increasingly likely that the theater of 21st century warfare will extend beyond the traditional arenas of land, sea and air to encompass the increasingly vital resources of outer space.
