President George H.W. Bush devoted much of his presidency to foreign affairs. President Bush is often lauded for America’s involvement in the Persian Gulf War, intervening to rightfully expel recalcitrant Iraqi forces wrongfully invading Kuwait at the bidding of Saddam Hussein. Bush’s close friendship with Mikhail Gorbachev, though disparaged for exerting undue influence on Bush’s sluggish reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union, ultimately behaved as a strengthening force between U.S.-Russia relations. Critics argue, however, that Bush’s foreign policy lacked substance, consistent style, adequate leadership, and, most fatefully, vision. In the book A World Transformed, Bush distinctively details his account and careful reaction to the disintegration of the Soviet Union which tragically illuminates an American president wavering during one of the most decisive moments of modern history: Instead of helping shape the post-Soviet world, Bush did not perceive the imminent Soviet collapse and subsequent seminal stages of Eastern European liberation. Through his reflections, the reader learns that Bush’s loyalties lay first and foremost with his friendship with Gorbachev and not with any premeditated plan to help liberate post-Soviet states from starvation, years of severe oppression, and dysfunctional government. A comparable state of affairs parallel to that of the collapse of the Soviet Union is occurring in North Korea. The Obama administration, like the Bush administration, is woefully defined by a derisory policy that exposes no overarching or guiding vision. Without a dramatic change in policy preparing for the inevitable collapse of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”, “North Korea”), the subsequent geopolitical tumult of the Korean peninsula will cast a menacing shadow over Obama and subsequent administrations.
Containment of North Korean nuclear weapons has preoccupied American foreign policy on the Korean peninsula for years. The typical United States pattern towards North Korea has been a perennial denouncement of the North Korean nuclear arsenal followed by negotiations usually involving China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, the regional nations with the highest immediate interest in the denuclearization of the DPRK. November 2010 evidence surfaced that North Korea continues to promote nuclear proliferation. During visit to Yongbyon, several American academics witnessed that North Korea had begun construction of a light-water reactor capable of generating 25-30 megawatts of electric power; light-water reactors are also typically capable of uranium-enrichment, which could in turn be fodder for another nuclear weapon. A uranium-enrichment plant further highlights that U.S.-promoted negotiations have failed. We are already living with a nuclear DPRK. Thus, U.S. objectives in dealing with North Korea need realistic realignment.
Although the nuclear issue is not a minor one, it should not monopolize the Obama administration’s concerns. Kim Jong-il’s regime appears increasingly unstable as his country faces another potentially devastating famine, compounded by South Korea’s reluctance to permit food aid to North Korea. U.S. State Department officials claim to be waiting for a World Food Program assessment of the severity of the famine and North Korean intent. Kim Jong-il’s failing health and the presumed succession of his son, Kim Jong-un, who is suspected to embrace the same political-military outlook at his father, portend potentially perilous times ahead for North Koreans. Should the regime disintegrate, North Korea’s immediate neighbors, South Korea and China, will be the recipients of starving North Korean refugees, hungering for food and freedom.
The Chinese relationship with North Korea complicates peninsular diplomacy by sustaining the North Korean regime through trade, investment, and economic assistance, rendering many U.S.-led sanctions ineffective. From the American point of view, China emerges as a culprit for aiding a nefarious regime and seemingly supporting her in the wake of the sinking Cheonan and Yeonpyeong military incidents. It is widely believed that China’s perceived recalcitrance stems from her desire to stave off a U.S. presence, already too close for comfort in South Korea. China also provides just enough food and energy to prevent collapse of the DPRK regime and burdensome refugees from depleting Chinese resources.
Obama’s limits of power and international influence are well known in light of America’s political domestic restraints and waning war chest, which make the Korean peninsula a volatile tinder box. The North Korean regime may collapse during Obama’s tenure. Obama’s deliberative, Jeffersonian foreign policy inclinations will pay dividends in the era of selective and multilateral Wilsonian engagement. The challenge is upon Obama to exert strong leadership skills and creative foresight to anticipate the fate of the two Koreas, proactively engaging regional powers and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations to craft a plan of reunification, if that is determined to be an adequate response to the collapse of North Korea.
This task is a formidable one, as evidenced by the failure of preceding administrations. The U.S. is a staunch military and diplomatic ally to South Korea, honoring a commitment deriving from the Korean War, which has yet to end. The U.S. will thus inevitably play a crucial role in any reunification process. The extent to which America participates and guides the process will hinge on visionary groundwork. Signatories to the 1953 Korean War Armistice agreement have a stake in resolving the war and developing a reunification plan. The perennial challenge to palliate China’s suspicions of the U.S. and mitigate her dual allegiances provide ample opportunity for America to find shared mutual goals with China and work in a partnership to reunite the Korean peninsula under one government. The Obama administration’s current policy of “strategic patience,” repudiating engagement with Pyongyang based on the false assumption that political and economic containment is viable, seems to be code for a plan lacking focused strategy. Obama would benefit to learn from Bush’s shortcomings. His administration should be poised to leverage its strengths of engagement while being mindful of political weakness. Blended elements of Jeffersonian fulfillment of a commitment to the Republic of Korea with Wilsonian faith in international institutions should serve as a foundation to guide America’s role in the aftermath of a DPRK collapse. Mindful of clearly delineated goals, Obama will have the power to promote the freedom of exchange of ideas and people in a reunited Korea. Effective leverage of economic, energy, food, commerce, and educational exchange with the eventual denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and concluded with China’s approval, will solidify Obama’s legacy as the ultimate peacemaker and humanitarian.
