Far East Forum Special Report from Suqian, China: Refining Small Business Development in China- (Posted by 任翔 on behalf of 安东武 )

Refining Small Business Development in China

ZHANG CAIJUN

So I've never set foot inside a developing-world corn oil refinery until today, but after an hour climbing fractured sheet metal staircases to various levels of gleaming freshly-installed machinery, I now have a basic understanding of both the production process and the business challenges facing its ebullient and ambitious owner. At this point a lack of business and management training are pretty much the only hurdles between Zhang Caijun and his goal- selling his own corn oil brand directly to customers. He has already secured access to a line of microcredit through Opportunity International (OI) China's Suqian branch, where I'm working this summer.

Zhang demonstrated the function of each machine in the factory with intimate familiarity, for he had singlehandedly overseen their purchase and installation, and is primarily responsible for their operation, maintenance and replacement. He seemed to take almost a father's pride in sharing the production process with us, from start to finish.

Running at full capacity the factory requires only five additional employees, whom he trains personally. At this point he conducts every administrative aspect of the of the business himself. The result is forty tons of kitchen-ready corn oil per day, which is sold at rock-bottom prices to distributors, slapped with their label, then shipped and sold at much higher cost to supermarkets and food manufacturers. Starting as an uneducated corn oil peddler, Zhang was able to build the factory from the ground up and secure a series of loans to purchase new equipment (the hardware) and refine his product, yet he lacks the training and expertise (software, as he described it in Mandarin) to transition into a company capable of marketing and distributing its own brand.

Zhang's dilemma is how to cut out the middlemen (distributors), when the only public advertisement he has bearing his own label is printed on the sign above the factory, and his brand recognition is limited to a handful of tenants who rent property on the compound during the off-season to help him make ends meet, along with a small cohort of ten part-time* workers.

OI CHINA

Visiting the workplaces of OI China's microfinance clients affords a unique look into business in its infancy- all of the genetic material is present for evolution into a larger and mature entity, but things are underdeveloped, awkwardly proportioned, in need of guidance- often in the form of financial support and professional training.

The CEO of OI China- a personable Australian of Chinese descent and stalwart Christian faith named Aaron White- privately compared his microfinance philosophy to the holistic approach of traditional Chinese medicine. Western medicine and capitalism tend to favor the scalpel: isolate and remove the harmful or unproductive elements, then prescribe and administer an external cure based on what has empirically proven to work best for the greatest fraction of test cases.

Aaron's strategy (paralleling Chinese medicine) evaluates the subject as a holistic individual, determines what is out of balance, and then patiently sets to work remedying that imbalance. Operationally, this can be accomplished through small loans with conditions and repayment plans tailored to the unique business cycle of the client's industry, through financial or management training from volunteer consultants*, or to insurance policies which help hedge against drought and other factors not commonly covered by commercial financial services. (Microfinance institutions (MFIs) abroad often also collect savings, which helps both client and MFI, but government regulations at the state and provincial levels currently prohibit this in the PRC.)

When I ask the clients we meet why the choose OI China as a business partner, their first response usually concerns the flexibility of repayment options, followed by the personal relationships developed through frequent check-ins and visits, and finally the training services offered by the organization. Many clients lack collateral or are seeking such small loans that banks aren't interested in them as profitable customers, so microfinance providers may be their only option. Competitive interest rates relative to the MFI competition, and the use of innovations like mobile banking (using vans to reach more remote clients; when they reach sufficient scale they will look into partnering with China Mobile to provide cell phone banking), are helping OI China to quickly expand into rural areas.

That's all for now out of Suqian. Until next time,

安东武

*I've learned from other site visits that production in many of the areas rurally-based industries is spotty during the harvest season, because higher relative wages (or the farmers' own family demands) gathering wheat, rice, and other crops pull laborers out of the factories.

*One consultant, David Mumma, accompanied us to Zhang Caijun's oil factory- he was involved with shoe manufacturing factories throughout East Asia until retirement. The other intern here in the office with me is Tracy Quek, a former journalist for Singapore's Straits Times and current master's degree candidate at Johns Hopkins' SAIS in DC.

Real Estate in Asia: Where are the bubbles, and where is it safe to invest? Far East Forum Special Edition from Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia

People have been talking about it for more than six months. Various and sundry predictions as to when it is going to happen have floated around analysts desks, newspaper editors ears, and even across the coffee or tea table. Yet, thus far, there has been scant definitive, damning evidence and even less written on the subject. I am of course referring to the Mainland Chinese real estate boom (soon to be bust).

Last week’s WSJ article did a tidy job of explaining where the market is heading in Beijing. There is really no telling how fast this is going to happen. Prices have been skyrocketing in Shanghai and Beijing (in particular) as well as Hong Kong over the past few years. Just this past fall the Beijing government attempted to cool the market via restricting home ownership to two properties per person.

This has a number of important implications for the world, as it could be a burst as opposed to simply a ‘deflation.’ Real estate risk is substantial in China because much of the growth has been predicated on increasing land and property values. This will no doubt have an impact on commodity prices for things like sheetrock, steel, copper (as pointed out in the WSJ article), as well as numerous other building supplies.

In addition to the commodity price downturn, Chinese banks holding mortgages could face problems similar to those experienced by US banks during the financial crisis. If the property values decline by 10-20% (as this article suggests), there could be a drastic increase in default risk.

In Hong Kong, the local government is taking up a number of measures including building public housing, re-zoning land, lowering the mortgage amounts that can be borrowed, penalizing back-to-back sales (they have a multi-tiered penalty system within 2 years, and a 15% penalty if a property is re-sold within 6 months!), and increasing the cost of buying for non-residents. (See the South China Morning Post’s article entitled. “Tough Measures to cool homes market”). All of these measures are designed to slow a market whose prices have gone up 18% in the last year (See SCMP’s “Market boom leads to gloom”).

Even across the Strait in the de-facto independent Taiwanese market, prices are still on the rise (somewhere between 10-20% depending on location). There was a lot of speculation about the sharp price increases after Taipei opened the Taiwan home market up to Mainland Chinese in June 2010. The government in Taiwan has also acted to cool the prices by introducing a luxury tax on properties that reach a threshold value. This has apparently worked to some extent because brokerages reported a 20-30% decline in sales after the announcement of this policy (See the China Post’s article entitled “Home prices rise in May despite luxury tax: real estate firms”).

All this begs the question, where should real estate investors send their money in Asia? Based on my own recent experience, I suggest Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia as a destination. Rent prices here are comparable to many American cities (depending on the place). Even more lucrative than this is a business known as ‘mediation.’ Exactly as it sounds, this involves someone fluent in both English and Mongolian that acts as a go-between for foreign tenants and local landlords. They often charge tenants and landlords $500 US each for ‘facilitating and managing the transaction.’ It strikes me that the value-added of this kind of service is extremely low, and offers huge potential for anyone willing and able to provide similar services.

Offices, luxury brand shopping, and a complete (excepting a single Kenny Rogers Roasters) dearth of western food chains in the city are three of the most lucrative opportunities I have witnessed since moving here. Next to Sukhbaatar Square the Central Tower claims a Louis Vuitton, Armani, and Hugo Boss store. People in UB claim that for at least a short period of time the LV Store was the highest grossing in all of Asia. Right across the street is another new gleaming building, the Blue Sky Tower, which according to MAD investment solutions is the tallest structure in Mongolia (Article). Yet, there is not a single Starbucks, McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, or KFC. Not that any one brand is necessary, it is striking that most developing countries have at least one of these to offer whereas Mongolia has not even one.

Up Next: China’s New Conflict in the South China Sea

"There's only one China... composed of two separate and completely different Chinas"

A friend of mine from Taiwan brought this to my attention. It's a brilliant tongue-and-cheek explanation of Taiwan Strait Issue by Michael Chamberlain and Charlie Pickering of The Mansion, a 2008 Australian satirical news show.

Professor Robert Berring of UC Berkeley once called the Taiwan Strait Issue an unusual (and perhaps unnatural) situation in international law. From this video, it's pretty self-evident as to why.

Henry Kissinger: On China

Yesterday, Dr. Henry Kissinger appeared on the Charlie Rose Show to promote his new book On China. I found the interview to be very interesting. 

Some salient points:

• Two key issues that China faces in the next decade: (1) reconciling economic change with their political system, and (2) dealing with the fallout of the One Child Policy.
• China's fear is the U.S. geopolitically encircling it a la containment. The U.S.'s implicit fear is China creating an East Asian Bloc and pushing it out of the region. There needs to be more high-level bilateral dialogue between China and the U.S. so that both sides understand each other's views and fears (see Youtube clip below).
• Too many people on both sides erroneously see individual events on the other side as part of a larger plan to contain their influence. 
• With regards to human rights, the U.S. needs to understand that China doesn't want to be lectured. China needs to understand that Americans innately feel strongly about transgressions on individual human dignity.
• There has never been a smooth regime change in China -- China's history alternates between stability and disintegration. There is a latent fear of mass chaos via regime change.    
• The recent financial crisis has struck a blow against the legitimacy of U.S. economic policies in the eyes of the Chinese. 

See the full interview at: http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/11701

Confucius (the Movie) and Trade Protectionism

A year ago, I came across a rather amusing New York Times article regarding China's film policies. The article reported that Chinese authorities removed the Hollywood sci-fi film Avatar from their theaters to ensure the box office success of domestic productions such as Confucius (starring Chow Yun-fat as the eponymous sagely philosopher). This is common practice in China. China only allows 20 foreign films into the country every year, and usually limits their screenings to 10 days.

It's therefore no surprise that Hollywood wasn't amused. In fact, the United States has taken this issue up to the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Body, arguing that China's film policies violate international trade law. The WTO has ruled in the U.S.'s favor.

According to an article by Professor Stanley Lubman of Berkeley Law, China argued that it had the right to set import quotas under Article XX(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which condones trade protections designed to "protect public morals". The WTO accepted this argument, but decided that China's way of executing its trade policies -- in which the importation of foreign films is controlled by 2 state-owned companies -- is unacceptable. If China doesn't comply with the WTO's ruling, the United States can impose retaliatory trade measures on Chinese exports.

Professor Lubman implied that China's concern with "public morals" has to do with the government's stance on politically touchy views. I would, however, like to point out several other possible motivations behind China's policies:

(1) Industrial Policy: Cinema is an industry that China believes has substantial export potential. It may therefore decide that it wants domestic films to thrive under trade protection while it preps the industry to compete globally.

(2) National Pride: China may believe that it's necessary to protect products that are emblematic of its national culture from international competition. And what's more Chinese than a film about Confucius?

(3) Soft Power: Combine the previous two points and we arrive at another insight. As a 2010 Guardian article points out, movies can serve as a major soft power resource, and a film industry that can compete internationally can generate substantial soft power. Exporting culturally-rich movies like Confucius can lead to international influence -- provided that they can compete toe-to-toe with the next James Cameron flick.

Law and Financial Sector Development in China

A few days back, over at Naked Capitalism, Yves had a guest blogger discussing why China is different. Readers of Rogoff and Reinhart will cringe, as Yves notes in the comments section, but the post's extended discussion of the unique features of China's economic development is certainly thought provoking. However, for now I just want to focus on a few points made on financial sector development:

What everyone should be watching is what China is doing in its finance system, and it is moving very fast (and the shadow banking system is moving even faster). It has reformed the four key banks, allowed foreign banks to come in a limited way, managed its SOEs, started to develop a securities industry, started to develop a corporate bond market. But it is quite a balancing act. It still lacks the micro-infrastructure, such as accounting law, securities law, governance structures and so on that are necessary to having a fully functioning cost of capital – that is, capitalism (of a twentieth century type, as opposed to the much sicker, twenty first century type appearing in the West). The aim needs to be to stop the heavy dependence on various forms of lending, by instigating a shift to a better balance between shares, bonds and bank deposits as the capital structure (in developed economies they are roughy in balance). Big equity and bond markets are much safer than a system that depends mostly on bank lending because equity markets and bond markets can reprice without the system breaking, whereas banks break. So it is an issue of national security for the Chinese leadership.

Main takeaways: 1) China has reformed the big four banks, 2) allowed some foreign access to financial markets, 3) started to develop non-equity capital markets, 4) lacks the legal and regulatory framework necessary for these capital markets to full develop and 5) should do all this with the aim of creating financing options outside of the banking sector.

I don't think anyone would contest points 2), 3) or 5), so we can leave them for now and focus on 1) and 4). Has China really reformed its big banks in a meaningful way? Are the legal obstacles just due to a lack of proper laws or institutions? I find it difficult to agree on these points.

With regards to 1), yes, its true that the Big Four banks no longer have massive non-preforming loan (NPL) ratios, but that is hardly due to any substantial reform. Government financed Asset Management Companies (AMCs) bought the NPLs at face value, despite the fact that they are bad loans. While this certainly helped remove the problematic loans from Chinese banks' balance sheets, it did nothing to reform their lending standards. In fact, by creating such a serious moral hazard problem, it may have made them harder to reform. Sure, the introduction of western banks as minority shareholders might help improve lending practices, but the most recent stimulus package has restarted the cycle of reckless lending. Perhaps, as this round's bad loans begin to surface the Chinese government will handle them differently, but its starting to look like a regular cycle.

This, of course, leads us to point 4) regarding the legal and institutional framework for deeper capital markets. It is true that the government is playing catch up, developing new laws and regulatory structures where none exist. However, the problem is not simply a lack of laws: there is an active effort to manipulate the laws they do have. Take, for example, the July 2009 Chinese Supreme Court ruling against UBS (PwC has a great summary in their 2009 NPL Asia Newsletter). In March 2009 the Supreme Court issued a guidance clarifying when courts can rule on investors' claims on NPLs purchased from the AMCs (the answer: when the claims are not on state owned enterprises). While the original guidance was not great, it did clarify when investors could make claims on NPLs and when they couldn't. However, just four months later, in the UBS case, the Supreme Court changed its position indicating that all NPL claims require consent to be transferred to foreign investors, citing older laws and regulations, which the 2009 guidance had appeared to supersede. Why did the Supreme Court change its position? The PwC newsletter speculates it was a political message to foreign investors. Regardless, the result was predictable: most major players left what was a promising and growing market in the financial sector because of an unpredictable legal framework. The point is that while China may still be lacking in the laws and regulations needed for deepening capital markets, it is not making a serious effort at using what laws it does have.

This is important because the post goes on to explain that the top-notch leadership in China is working on filling in the holes:

It would be a fool who thinks the Chinese don’t understand the challenge; they do. Having your life on the line if you get it wrong does rather tend to concentrate politicians’ minds. To get to the top in China on your merits when there is a billion people ensures some serious quality; we can safely assume that some of the Chinese leadership has significant intellectual grunt. It would be worthwhile to listen very closely to what the Chinese say about their understanding of capitalism and what it is doing at the micro, institutional level with its financial system, not so much what it does with the macro-economic levers.

This position seeks to mitigate criticism of Chinese leadership. In essence it says "The problem is a lack of good laws, but very smart and responsible people are working on fixing that." Yet when they make new laws to address these problems they have no problem casting them to the wind for arbitrary political purposes. That this arbitrary change in law closed a potential venue for the government to recover something on its existing NPLs only shows how self-defeating these efforts can be.

China claims to be serious about developing deeper capital markets, and I am confident that many in the government are serious. However, China will be confronting some major structural problems if it cannot properly address financial sector reform. This can't happen until leadership stops using the legal system for political ends.

Public Perceptions of China in the US: Friends, Frenemies, or Foes?

From a short paper that I did for a statistics course:

Spring 2009 Pew Research data bivariate comparison and analysis of US individual economic satisfaction and perceptions of China.

I suggest that in a comparison of US citizens, those citing a lower level of individual economic satisfaction will be more likely to have a less favorable view (as a measure of public perception) of the People’s Republic of China than will those individuals indicating a higher level of individual economic satisfaction.

There is a strong domestic determinate of personal economic satisfaction that is closely related to public perceptions of the People’s Republic of China. The reasoning behind such a hypothesis is rooted in the common perception that blue collar (particularly) but also some white-collar jobs have been lost to the Chinese. For this reason, individuals experiencing various forms of economic hardship (unemployment, having family/ friends who are unemployed, perceptions of reduced buying power, investments and savings, stock performance, etc.) are likely to seek some sort of explanatory factor. At present, and largely attributable to the 2008 Olympic games, China’s role in the world has been highlighted. It is because of this confluence, that I propose that the greater the self-reported level of economic dissatisfaction, the less favorable will be the public perception of the Chinese.


In this analysis, the two variables considered are personal economic satisfaction and the public perception of China. Personal economic satisfaction is the independent, nominal variable, while the public perceptions stands as the dependent, nominal variable. Nearly 60% of those citing very good personal economic situations have a “somewhat favorable” or better view of China, whereas only 47.83% of those citing a very bad personal economic satisfaction cite having a “somewhat favorable” or better view of China. The converse is also interesting. Amongst those people indicating a “very good” personal economic situation, only 39.95% have a “somewhat negative” or worse view of China. Of those that indicated a “very bad” personal economic situation, 52.18 also reported a “somewhat unfavorable” or worse opinion of China.

Closer examination of the data reveals what appears to be a positive, linear trend suggesting that indeed the lower the personal economic satisfaction, the more negative the perceptions of China. In reaching this conclusion it is important to consider the favorable/somewhat favorable and very unfavorable/somewhat unfavorable categories of public perceptions as two (rather than four) categories. It is important to note also the two far right columns of the graph. These categories are people who either did not know how to characterize their economic situation, or refused to do so. Let us first consider those who do not know how to categorize their individual economic situation. There are a number of possible explanations for this including inattentive individuals, real concerns about the economic outlook, or a flaw in the survey methodology. In this category it is interesting to note that the “somewhat unfavorable” and “very favorable) categories completely disappear. Thus it would seem that if Americans have uncertainty about their personal economic situations, more than half of those individuals also seem to hold extremely negative views of China and none exhibit “very favorable” views. For these reasons, I would argue that this category does in fact lend to proving the hypothesis. On the other hand, the final category (“Refused”) on the graph does not support nor disprove the hypothesis. There are a variety of reasons that individuals might choose not to answer this question—including people who believe in personal privacy.

China Wikileaks: GDP numbers are false; alternative measures available

To a Sinophile or anyone who has spoken with a university economist in China, this is not news. In fact, this is less than news. To any brave traveller who has made it past the east coast cities and poked around the Chinese interior, this is also not particularly interesting.

What is interesting is to hear this from the man who will be China’s next Premier in 2012. (See the WSJ 12/6 article entitled, “Chinese Leader Called Data 'Man-Made'”).

Here are the facts from the cables as reported by Ambassador Clark Randt:

1. Li Keqing refers to China’s GDP numbers as being ‘manmade’, and “for reference only”
2. He further suggests looking at electricity consumption, rail freight volume, and lastly loan disbursement/ interest rates charged
3. The reason for selecting these is based upon supposed accuracy over-and-above other measures.

A number of large firms in the US that track Chinese data use similar measures to estimate actual economic growth in China. A recent working paper published by the School of Public Policy at George Mason University suggested focusing on satellite imagery and urban lights as a way to measure growth. The WSJ also wrote about this in their "Real Time China Report" (See "Bright Lights, Big Cities: A China GDP Alternative?")

The nagging question: how can one accurately measure GDP growth?

There is clearly a need for stand-in indicators. Ideally, these should take into account the present/ immediate past, the short-term future, and medium-term outlook. Electricity consumption might be a fairly robust present or immediate past indicator. Rail freight seems like it could be a good stand-in for the short-term future (it could represent commodities to be sold in the near-term like foodstuffs, agricultural products, or intermediate goods). Finally, the loan disbursement represents the medium-term (or longer term) investments that should compose GDP growth.

How about other potential measures? Water consumption? Water is the bottleneck of industrial production. It follows that the government and industry would want extremely accurate figures on water. Water consumption is a good way to measure certain types of industrial production.

A friend of mine recently suggested looking at loan defaults. This would provide a good barometer of economic trouble.

How about using satellites to count the number of large industrial ships that enter and leave China in a given period? This could then be compared to historical trends.

There are all sorts of interesting possibilities.